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Constitutional Law-SEARCHES AND SEIZUREs-ExcLUSIONARY 
RULE INAPPLICABLE TO FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PROCEEDING WHERE 
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED IN STATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TION-United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
In November 1968 Los Angeles police seized wagering records 
and $4,940 from Max Janis in reliance on a search warrant. One 
of the police officers informed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
of the arrest and seizure and subsequently assisted an IRS agent 
in analyzing the seized wagering records. Using a calculation 
based upon these records, the IRS assessed Janis $89,026.09 in 
wagering excise taxes and levied on the seized $4,940 in partial 
satisfaction. 
In a state criminal proceeding for violation of local gambling 
laws, the warrant was declared invalid and the seized records 
were held inadmissible.• Janis subsequently brought an action in 
federal district court for refund of the $4,940 and to have the 
deficiency assessment quashed. The IRS counterclaimed for the 
unpaid balance of the assessment. 
Concluding that the assessment was based substantially on 
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the dis-
trict court held that the assessment was invalid and that Janis 
was entitled to a refund. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.2 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the "exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid 
the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized 
by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign.' '3 
I. BACKGROUND 
The exclusionary rule of evidence was adopted by the Su-
preme Court as a means of enforcing fourth amendment guaran-
tees against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 Since the 1961 
1. The state court found that the affidavit supporting the warrant "did not set forth, 
in sufficient detail, the underlying circumstances to enable the issuing magistrate to 
determine independently the reliability of the information supplied by the informants." 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 437-38 (1976). This standard was articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), after the search warrant 
in the instant case had been issued, 428 U.S. at 437. 
2. Unpublished memorandum without opinion. 428 U.S. at 439. 
3. ld. at 459-60. 
4. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which made the exclusionary rule 
binding on the federal courts, the Supreme Court said: 
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United 
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under 
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decision of Mapp v. Ohio, 5 evidence resulting from an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure has been inadmissible in state, as well 
as federal, criminal proceedings. The effect of the exclusionary 
rule in civil proceedings, however, has not been clear.8 This sec-
tion will examine the applicability of the exclusionary rule to civil 
cases in general and to ci vii tax cases in particular. 7 
A. The Supreme Court and Civil Applicability of the 
Exclusionary Rule 
The Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary rule 
to exclude illegally seized evidence from true civil proceedings.8 
Its decisions have indicated ambivalence, however, as some have 
suggested the rule's potential applicability in noncriminal cases 
while others have indicated hostility toward the prospect of ex-
tending the rule into the civil arena. 
It is well established that the exclusionary rule is applicable 
in quasi-criminal proceedings-proceedings that are technically 
civil but actually penal in nature.9 In the 1886 case of Boyd v. 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and 
to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law .... The tendency 
of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by 
means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions ... should find no sanction 
in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support 
of the Constitution .... 
ld. at 391-92. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule, see 
Geller, Enforcing The Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 
U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970). 
5. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
6. E.g., Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392,403 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); 43 DEN. 
L.J. 511 (1966); 55 VA. L. REv. 1484 (1969); 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1583 (1973). While some 
courts and commentators have perceived the Supreme Court as moving toward applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in civil cases, the Court has never explicitly decided the 
question. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 802 (1972); note 21 and accompanying text 
infra. 
7. For a collection of civil cases in which the exclusionary rule is at issue, see Annot., 
5 A.L.R.3d 670 (1966). 
8. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976). 
9. This term has been defined as follows: 
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than criminal in form 
have sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal" by the Supreme Court. These 
laws, broadly speaking, provide for civil money penalties, forfeitures of property, 
and the punitive imposition of various disabilities, such as the loss of profes-
sional license or public employment. 
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional 
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 381 (1976)(footnotes omitted). 
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United States, 10 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a fed-
eral revenue statute requiring the defendant in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding to produce documents requested by the government or to 
have a refusal to do so taken as evidence of guilt. The Court found 
that forfeiture proceedings, "though they may be civil in form, 
are in their nature criminal."11 Given the quasi-criminal nature 
of the action, the Court held the compulsory production of private 
papers equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure and held 
the statute unconstitutional under the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. In the more recent case of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
Pennsylvania, 12 state officials brought a forfeiture action against 
an automobile seized after an illegal search had revealed liquor 
not bearing appropriate tax seals. Recalling the Boyd precedent, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that since forfeiture represented a 
penalty for the criminal offense, it would be anomalous to exclude 
evidence from a criminal proceeding but not from a forfeiture 
proceeding that required a determination that the law had been 
violated. 13 
Several Supreme Court opinions in criminal cases suggest 
that the exclusionary rule is not limited to the criminal or quasi-
criminal areas. For example, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 14 a case extending fourth amendment protections 
to corporations accused of criminal activity, the Court said: "The 
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a 
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be 
used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all." 15 In 
Weeks v. United States,t6 the Court stated that fourth amend-
ment protection "reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or 
not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon 
all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of 
the laws. " 17 
The tandem decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court 18 and 
See v. City of Seattle19 carried fourth amendment protections into 
10. 116 u.s. 616 (1886). 
11. /d. at 634. 
12. 380 u.s. 693 (1965). 
13. ld. at 701. 
14. 251 u.s. 385 (1920). 
15. /d. at 392. 
16. 232 u.s. 383 (1914). 
17. /d. at 392. 
18. 387 u.s. 523 (1967). 
19. 387 u.s. 541 (1967). 
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the area of administrative searches and seizures. The petitioners 
in both cases had been convicted of state criminal charges for 
refusing to permit warrantless administrative inspections. The 
Supreme Court reasoned in Camara that "[i]t is surely anoma-
lous to say that the individual and his private property are fully 
protected by the fourth amendment only when the individual is 
suspected of criminal behavior."20 Some commentators saw this 
development as presaging the extension of the exclusionary rule 
to civil proceedings. 21 
Although the above cases suggest an expansion of the exclu-
sionary rule into civil actions, other recent decisions of the Court, 
by focusing on the theoretical justifications for the rule, have 
limited its scope.22 Three dominant justifications for the rule have 
been recognized by the courts. The first, judicial integrity,23 is 
concerned with protecting the integrity of the judicial process by 
declining to admit evidence tainted by illegal searches and sei-
zures. The second justification stresses the individual rights vio-
lated in an illegal search and seizure.24 It provides that any justifi-
cation for admitting the evidence is less weighty than the public 
policy condemning the violation of fourth amendment rights. The 
third major justification for the rule is that it deters unlawful 
police conduct25-knowledge that the fruits of illegal searches and 
seizures will be inadmissible at trial tends to deter law enforce-
ment officers from violating fourth amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized the deter-
rence rationale in its opinions limiting the scope of the rule. In 
United States v. Calandra, 26 for example, the Court declined to 
extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. Defining 
20. 387 U.S. at 530 (footnote omitted). 
21. E.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 416; Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: 
Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314, 1345 (1967). 
22. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (rule of Almeida-Sanchez not 
applied retrospectively); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974) (language sug-
gesting exclusionary rule should not be applied when unconstitutional conduct is in good 
faith); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applicable 
to grand jury proceedings); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 
(1971) (Burger, C .J ., dissenting) (excoriates the exclusionary rule); Desist v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 244, 246, 253 (1969) (Katz not applied retrospectively; language suggests 
exclusionary rule inapplicable where deterrent purpose is not served); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-39 (1965) (Mapp not applied retrospectively). 
23. See Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 
12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 507, 510-11 (1975). 
24. !d. at 508-10. 
25. !d. at 511-17. 
26. 414 u.s. 338 (1974). 
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the purpose of the rule in terms of deterring unconstitutional 
police conduct, the Court reasoned that any "incremental deter-
rent effect" that might accrue by extending the rule would not 
outweigh the costs of its imposition.27 
One factor that the Court has considered important in weigh-
ing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is the presence or 
absence of good faith in the law enforcement officers conducting 
the illegal search and seizure. The presence of good faith in a 
particular situation reduces the deterrent effect of the rule. 28 
The recent tendency of the Court to limit the scope of the 
exclusionary rule by focusing on the deterrence rationale calls 
into question the forecasts of its extension made subsequent to 
Camara and See. 29 In view of the Supreme Court's apparent am-
bivalence, it is not surprising that lower courts directly confront-
ing the issue have reached mixed results. For analytical purposes, 
these lower court cases may be conveniently classified according 
to the party conducting the illegal search and seizure and the 
party seeking to use illegally seized evidence in the subsequent 
civil action. 
B. Lower Courts and Civil Applicability of the Exclusionary 
Rule 
1. Seizures by private individuals 
a. Private actions. The few cases dealing with the exclu-
sionary rule in the context of private actions involving nongovern-
mental searches and seizures are divided.30 A number of courts 
27. See id. at 351. The dissent in Calandra argued that focusing on the deterrence 
rationale was not only erroneous, but it positioned the Court to "abandon altogether the 
exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases." ld. at 365. 
28. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975). 
29. Note 21 and accompanying text supra. 
30. Leading cases excluding evidence obtained in nongovernmental seizures include: 
Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Ch. 1966), reu'd on other 
grounds, 97 N.J. Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240 (App. Div. 1967) (evidence illegally seized by 
spouse inadmissible in divorce action); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 
N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966) (letters illegally obtained by husband from divorced wife's car 
inadmissible in second divorce proceeding). 
Cases admitting evidence obtained in nongovernmental seizures include: Young v. 
Young, 213 Pa. Super. 515, 247 A.2d 659 (1968) (testimony related to illegal entry by 
husband and private investigator admissible in divorce action); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 
N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964) (proof of wife's adultery admissible in 
divorce action even though obtained by husband in illegal forcible entry into her home); 
Walker v. Penner, 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) (uncorked whisky bottle illegally 
removed from defendant's car by plaintiff's passenger admissible in personal injury ac-
tion). 
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have found the exclusionary rule applicable to private actions 
involving nongovernmental seizures. In Del Presto v. Del Presto, 31 
for instance, a state court announced that the rule of Mapp v. 
Ohio32 was applicable in civil as well as in criminal cases. In 
Williams v. Williams, 33 the court reasoned that while constitu-
tional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
were meant primarily to protect the citizen from governmental 
intrusions, the same protections should be extended to· cases in-
volving private searches and seizures because no individual 
should be granted "greater power than the government itself."34 
Courts declining to apply the exclusionary rule in private 
actions have generally taken the position that fourth amendment 
protections are unavailable when governmental intrusions are not 
involved. In sharp contrast to the Del Presto approach, for exam-
ple, the court in Sackler v. Sackler35 failed to exclude evidence 
illegally seized by the husband in a divorce action because it 
found the Mapp rule applicable only to government seizures. 
Similarly, in Walker v. Penner, 36 the court asserted that the 
"constitutional restrictions against unreasonable search and sei-
zure are intended as a limitation on the powers of government, 
and not a restraint on the unauthorized act of an individual."37 
b. Actions in which the government is a party. The cases 
involving actions in which the government is a party but where 
an illegal search and seizure was carried out by a private individ-
ual have focused primarily on the degree of governmental partici-
pation in the illegality. In Knoll Associates v. FTC, 38 the exclu-
sionary rule was applied where an illegal seizure was carried out 
by a private individual. In refusing to admit privately seized 
documents in the governmental proceeding, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that the private individual had stolen the documents for 
the purpose of assisting the FTC in a pending action and that the 
government had accepted the documents with knowledge of the 
illegal seizure. 39 
31. 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Ch. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 97 N.J. 
Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240 (App. Div. 1967). 
32. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
33. 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966). 
34. ld. at 162, 221 N.E.2d at 626. 
35. 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964). 
36. 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951). 
37. I d. at 548, 227 P.2d at 319. 
38. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968). 
39. ld. at 533. 
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A different result was reached in NLRB v. South Bay Daily 
Breeze. 40 In a proceeding to enforce an order of the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Ninth Circuit allowed into evidence a docu-
ment illegally taken by a private individual. In declining to apply 
the exclusionary rule, the court noted that, unlike the situation 
in Knoll, there was no showing that the purpose of the private 
seizure had been to aid the government in its action.41 The court 
further observed that fourth amendment protections were gener-
ally inapplicable to civil proceedings and that the deterrence ra-
tionale for the exclusionary rule was not persuasive when a non-
governmental seizure was at issue. 42 The court found support for 
its conclusion in Burdeau v. McDowell, 43 a criminal case in which 
the Supreme Court had not applied the exclusionary rule because 
the illegal seizure had been conducted by private parties without 
governmental participation or implied approbation. 
2. Seizures by government agents 
a. Private actions. Some courts have excluded evidence in 
private actions involving governmental seizures, finding no dis-
tinction between civil and criminal actions in terms of the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule. 44 Other courts have admitted 
illegally seized evidence, however, recognizing a difference in 
the applicability of fourth amendment protections to civil and 
criminal actions.45 
40. 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
41. /d. at 363. 
42. /d. at 363-64. 
43. 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Some cases finding the exclusionary rule applicable to civil 
actions involving nongovernmental searches and seizures have suggested that Burdeau 
was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 
(1960). E.g., Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 307, 223 A.2d 217, 218 (Ch. 
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 97 N.J. Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240 (App. Div. 1967). The 
Supreme Court in the instant case, however, indicated that Burdeau has retained its 
validity. 428 U.S. at 455 n.31. 
44. Cases in which the evidence has been excluded include: Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 
Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958) (error to admit evidence indicating intoxication based 
on police-directed blood test of unconscious defendant in wrongful death action); Gilbert 
v. Leach, 62 Mich. App. 722, 233 N.W.2d 840 (1975) (exclusion of blood alcohol test 
performed at police request on defendant in negligence action where there was question 
as to defendant's consent); Irizarry v. City of New York, 79 Misc. 2d 346, 357 N.Y.S.2d 
756 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (evidence illegally obtained by police inadmissible in malicious prose-
cution suit brought by private citizen). 
45. Cases in which evidence has been admitted include: Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 
510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (evidence obtained in unauthor-
ized search of plaintiff's home by state and local officials admissible in action to recover 
on fire insurance policy); Herndon v. City oflthaca, 43 App. Div. 2d 634, 349 N.Y.S.2d 
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b. Governmental actions. The body of case law becomes 
larger and somewhat more consistent on the role of the exclusion-
ary rule in government civil actions involving seizures by govern-
ment agents. In most cases the rule has been found to apply.46 
Most of the cases in this class fit the quasi-criminal description. 
Tax cases, particularly relevant to the instant case, will also be 
treated in this section. 
Quasi-criminal cases. Although forfeiture proceedings are 
the most numerous of the quasi-criminal class, 47 the quasi-
criminal rationale has been employed to exclude illegally seized 
evidence in a variety of governmental proceedings. 48 While the 
majority of the cases that could be classified as quasi-criminal 
invoke the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence illegally seized 
by government agents, there are some exceptions. Before 
Plymouth Sedan, for example, it was not unusual for courts to 
decline to apply the exclusionary rule in forfeiture cases.49 Recent 
decisions have also refused to apply the rule in arguably quasi-
criminal circumstances. In United States v. Fitzpatrick, 50 for in-
stance, the Second Circuit refused to apply the rule to exclude 
illegally seized evidence from a parole revocation proceeding. The 
court's rationale emphasized that suppression would hamper the 
parole system by requiring collateral suppression hearings with-
out serving the deterrent purpose of the rule.51 Similar reasoning 
was applied in United States v. Schipani, 52 where the court de-
clined to apply the exclusionary rule in a sentencing proceeding.53 
227 (Sup. Ct. 1973); appeal dismissed, 35 N.Y.2d 956, 324 N.E.2d 555, 365 N.Y.S.2d 176 
(1974) (evidence illegally obtained by police admissible in personal injury action). 
46. A selection of such cases is included in Annat., 5 A.L.R.3d 670 (1966). 
47. See notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra. 
48. E.g., Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (D.C. Mont.), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1920) (deportation proceeding); Iowa v. Union 
Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil 
Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (antitrust proceeding); People v. Moore, 69 
Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (civil narcotic commitment proceeding); 
Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (proceeding to abate gambling nuis-
ance); La Penta v. New York State Liquor Auth., 30 App. Div. 2d 1033, 294 N.Y.S.2d 947 
(Sup. Ct. 1968), alf'd, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1969) (liquor 
license revocation action). 
49. E.g., Martin v. United States, 277 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1960). 
50. 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970). 
51. ld. at 1164. The court noted that the exclusionary rule was available in the 
criminal proceeding and that the deterrent purpose of the rule was adequately served by 
suppression there. 
52. 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). 
53. ld. at 38: "We believe that applying the exclusionary rule for a second time at 
sentencing after having already applied it once at the trial itself would not add in any 
significant way to the deterrent effect of the rule." 
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Instead of concerning itself with the nature of the proceeding, the 
court in each case considered the practical effect of imposing the 
exclusionary rule, finding that the cost outweighed the benefit. 
Civil tax cases. Lower court decisions have almost uniformly 
applied the exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings. 54 The cases 
typically involve a fourth amendment challenge to a wagering tax 
assessment on the ground that it is based on illegally seized evi-
dence. The challenge may be raised by way of an action for in-
junction or refund55 or simply as part of a defense. 56 Some courts 
assert that fourth amendment protections are as applicable in 
principle to civil cases in which the government has illegally 
seized evidence as they are in criminal cases. 57 Another approach 
is to view the tax action as essentially quasi-criminal. In United 
States v. Blank, 58 for instance, the court reasoned that large civil 
assessments and penalties are tantamount to criminal sanctions 
54. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 
(1969) (exclusionary rule applied in action to enjoin levy of jeopardy assessment); Ander· 
son v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (fruits of unlawful search and seizure 
cannot support assessment); Yannicelli v. Nash, 354 F. Supp. 143 (D.N.J. 1973) (dictum 
to the effect that assessment is invalid when substantially based on illegally seized evi-
dence; but government may place lien on illegally seized property retained in custody); 
United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (dictum to the effect that evidence illegally seized 
by government officials would be excluded from civil action); United States v. Blank, 261 
F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (exclusion of evidence seized by IRS from deficiency 
assessment proceeding); United States v. Chase, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 15,733 (D.D.C. 
1966) (assessment based on illegally seized material inadmissible in suit brought by gov-
ernment); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 
371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967) (suppression for criminal or civil 
proceedings ordered for evidence illegally seized by government); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. 
Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), appeal dismissed, 334 F.2d 742 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 961 (1965), aff'd sub nom. McGarry's Inc. v. Rose, 344 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1965) 
(government barred from using illegally seized evidence against taxpayer); Lassoff v. 
Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (assessment held invalid when based solely on 
evidence illegally seized by IRS); Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1948), rev'd 
on other grounds, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949) (dictum to the effect that assessment would 
be invalid if based solely on illegally obtained evidence); Hill v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 
846 (1973) (dictum to the effect that evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment 
should not be admitted in assessment proceeding); Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 
(1972) (suppression of assessment evidence illegally seized by police). But cf. Compton v. 
United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964) (presumption of correctness given tax assess-
ment unaffected by the fact that it was based on unconstitutionally seized evidence; 
illegally seized evidence may be used for impeachment purposes). 
55. E.g., Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
986 (1969) (injunction); Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964) (refund). 
56. E.g., United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966). 
57. E.g., United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 
738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969). 
58. 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966). 
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and that the government should not be able to excuse its violation 
of constitutional mandates by choosing a "civil forum."59 
Recent civil tax assessment cases, factually similar to the 
instant case, have applied the exclusionary rule. In Pizzarello u. 
United States, 60 the taxpayer brought an action to enjoin a jeop-
ardy assessment for unpaid wagering taxes on money illegally 
seized by special treasury agents. In a prior criminal action, the 
evidence of wagering had been suppressed. Observing that with-
out an exclusionary rule the government would be free to conduct 
unreasonable searches and seizures in all civil cases without suf-
fering unfavorable consequences, the Second Circuit found the 
assessment invalid. 61 In Suarez u. Commissioner, 62 an illegal 
search and seizure had been carried out by state criminal law 
enforcement officers. In a criminal action, the illegally seized 
records had been suppressed. The police had made copies of these 
same records available to the IRS, which brought a civil assess-
ment action. The court found support for the application of the 
exclusionary rule in language used by the Supreme Court.63 Mter 
reviewing considerations of deterring unconstitutional conduct, 
preserving judicial integrity, and safeguarding individual rights, 
the court held that "the protective rule of the fourth amendment 
which excludes evidence illegally obtained is applicable in a civil 
tax case."64 Making explicit what was implicit in the majority 
opinion, a concurring opinion said that it was immaterial that 
federal agents had not conducted the illegal raid. 65 The majority 
concluded that the assessment carried no presumption of correct-
ness and that if the government were to prevail, it would have to 
establish the existence of a deficiency with evidence independent 
of that unconstitutionally seized.66 
These tax cases arose in the precise legal context in which the 
exclusionary rule issue in the instant case appeared. Whenever 
courts have dealt directly with the question of the exclusionary 
rule's applicability in the civil tax setting, they have found it 
applicable. 
59. !d. at 182. 
60. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969). 
61. !d. at 586. 
62. 58 T.C. 792 (1972). 
63. !d. at 802. 
64. !d. at 806. 
65. !d. at 819. 
66. !d. at 815. 
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II. INSTANT CASE 
A divided Supreme Court held in United States v. Janis that 
the exclusionary rule does not preclude the use in a civil proceed-
ing of one sovereign of evidence illegally seized in a criminal 
investigation by agents of another sovereignY In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority focused on what it termed the "prime 
purpose" of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of "future unlawful 
police conduct. " 68 
Observing that there was no evidence that the rule actually 
deters unlawful police conduct, 69 the Court concluded that the 
societal costs of excluding the evidence outweighed the benefits 
of suppression.70 The Court reasoned alternatively that (1) if the 
rule does not deter, its use in the instant situation was clearly 
unwarranted; and (2) if the rule does deter, its application in 
criminal proceedings must "be assumed to be a substantial and 
efficient deterrent. " 71 Assuming the efficacy of this deterrent ef-
fect in criminal cases, the Court said that further application of 
the rule to the civil proceeding of a sovereign different from the 
one involved in the illegal seizure would have such an attenuated 
deterrent effect that the costs to society would outweigh the bene-
fits of exclusion. 72 
The majority acknowledged that the exclusionary rule had 
been applied in civil proceedings in other federal courts. It distin-
guished those cases from the instant case, however, by pointing 
out that most of them involved "intrasovereign" fourth amend-
ment violations "in which the officer committing the unconstitu-
tional search or seizure was an agent of the sovereign that sought 
to use the evidence."73 The majority admitted that the exclusion-
ary rule had been applied in an intersovereign situation in the 
Suarez case, but disagreed with the result because the tax court 
67. 428 U.S. at 459-60. 
68. ld. at 446. 
69. After discussing the difficulties inherent in any empirical test of the rule, the 
Court stated: 
The final conclusion is clear. No empirical researcher, proponent or oppo-
nent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the 
rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is now applied .... 
We are aware of no study on the possible deterrent effect of excluding 
evidence in a civil proceeding. 
Id. at 450 n.22. 
70. ld. at 454. 
71. /d. at 453-54. 
72. /d. at 454. 
73. /d. at 456. 
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in Suarez had failed to focus on the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule and because it had failed to distinguish between 
intersovereign and intrasovereign uses of unconstitutionally 
seized evidence.74 
The majority also introduced a new formulation of the judi-
cial integrity rationale. 75 It indicated that the inquiry into 
whether judicial integrity would be served by the exclusion of 
evidence was essentially the same as inquiring whether the exclu-
sion of evidence in a particular case would deter police from mak-
ing fourth amendment violations. The focus in both inquiries was 
on whether the admission of illegally seized evidence would en':" 
courage violation of fourth amendment rights. The Court held 
that considerations of judicial integrity therefore did not require 
exclusion in this case. 76 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, em-
phasized individual rights instead of societal costs. He argued 
that the exclusionary rule is an inherent constitutional ingredient 
of fourth amendment protections and criticized the majority for 
limiting the rule. 77 
Justice Stewart, also dissenting, contended that wagering 
tax provisions constituted "an adjunct to the enforcement of the 
criminal law" and that the majority opinion frustrated the deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule by allowing state police to 
turn illegally seized evidence over to the IRS on a "silver plat-
ter. " 711 
III. ANALYSIS 
Given the proposition that deterrence is the primary justifi-
cation for the exclusionary rule, 79 the result reached in United 
States v. Janis is consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions 
limiting the rule's applicability. 80 While the opinion presents 
some difficulties, its essential soundness is not undermined by 
the dissenting contention that local and federal law enforcement 
officers will be free to act in concert to violate fourth amendment 
rights. 111 The decision is important because its rationale is hostile 
74. /d. at 456-57. 
75. See note 23 and accompanying text supra. 
76. 428 U.S. at 458 n.35. 
77. /d. at 460. 
78. /d. at 463-64. 
79. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
80. Notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra. 
81. 428 U.S. at 463. 
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to the application of the exclusionary rule to many civil litigation 
situations, as well as to tax assessment proceedings. It also seems 
to effectively eliminate the independent existence of the judicial 
integrity justification for the exclusionary rule. The following sec-
tion will examine some of the difficulties and implications of the 
opinion. 
A. The l)ifficulties 
1. The quasi-criminal argument for suppression 
Justice Stewart contends in dissent that "wagering [tax] 
provisions are intended not merely to raise revenue but also to 
assist" law enforcement officials in enforcing criminal penalties 
for "unlawful wagering activities."82 The contention suggests that 
the civil tax assessment proceeding in Janis was essentially quasi-
criminal and that therefore the exclusionary rule should apply. 
There is precedent for regarding a civil tax assessment pro-
ceeding as a quasi-criminal action. In United States v. Blank, 83 
the exclusionary rule was applied to exclude illegally seized evi-
dence from a civil tax proceeding. The federal district court in 
that case reasoned that if the exclusionary rule were not applica-
ble, the government could take the "accused down a civil avenue 
to impose its penalties while keeping itself free from the imping-
ing requirements of reasonableness which the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes."84 Blank may be distinguished from the present 
case, however, since it clearly involved the imposition of "taxes 
and penalties. " 85 
The quasi-criminal analysis of the instant case may never-
theless seem reasonable in light of the large assessment involved. 
But the analysis would be persuasive only if the excise tax assess-
ment itself were to be regarded as a penalty. 86 While common 
sense might suggest that tax assessments on wagering operations 
do partake of the nature of penalties, courts have held that the 
wagering excise tax is not a penalty but rather a revenue raising 
measureY The Supreme Court in Lewis v. United States, 88 for 
82. /d. at 461. 
83. 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966). 
84. !d. at 182. 
85. /d. at 184 (emphasis added). 
86. See note 9 supra. 
87. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955); United States v. Kahriger, 
345 U.S. 22 (1953); United States v. D.I. Operating Co., 362 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1024 (1967); Augusta Golf Ass'n v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 272 
(S.D. Ga. 1971). 
88. 348 u.s. 419 (1955). 
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example, said that the wagering tax provision "was a constitu-
tional exercise of the taxing power and was not a penalty under 
the guise of a tax. "89 
2. Danger of bad faith searches and seizures 
Justice Stewart also argued that the majority opinion will 
enable state police to "effectively crack down on gambling law 
violators by the simple expedient of violating their constitutional 
rights and turning the illegally seized evidence over to Internal 
Revenue Service agents on the proverbial 'silver platter.' " 90 Par-
ticularly in view of his contention that the civil tax action is not 
totally unrelated to the criminal law imperatives involved in 
bringing illegal wagering operators to justice,S1 the possibility of 
a "bad faith" raid is not unimaginable. For law enforcement offi-
cers frustrated with the intricacies of warrant requirements, the 
large civil assessments imposed on wagerers may provide satisfac-
tory sanctions. 
Justice Stewart's prediction is undermined, however, by the 
fact that the Los Angeles police relied in good faith on their 
search warrant-they did not knowingly use a defective warrant 
in order to seize evidence for the purpose of turning it over to the 
IRS.92 While it is true that the Court did not expressly rely on the 
89. ld. at 421. If the wagering excise tax had been determined to be a "penalty under 
the guise of a tax," it probably would have been found to constitute an unconstitutional 
application of the taxing power. 
It should be noted that Lewis was overruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 
39 (1968), to the extent that Marchetti found mandatory registration requirements for 
wagerers violative of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. Language 
in Marchetti, referred to by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Janis, does suggest that 
wagering tax provisions are rflated to criminal law enforcement provisions. While 
Marchetti does not invalidate the Lewis notion that the wagering tax provision is not a 
penalty, it does tend to put that notion into question. The fact that the Janis majority 
did not see the case in quasi-criminal terms suggests that the Marchetti dicta does not 
have much influence at present. 
90. 428 U.S. at 463. 
91. ld. at 462-63. The argument that civil tax actions against wagerers are part of a 
broad criminal enforcement procedure seems to be substantiated by the facts of the 
instant case demonstrating close cooperation between the law enforcement and tax au-
thorities. ld. at 436-37. 
92. ld. at 458 n.35. The majority never doubted that the purpose of the seizure was 
to procure evidence for a state criminal proceeding. The close cooperation between the law 
enforcement and tax authorities in the instant case, however, raises the possibility that a 
subsidiary purpose may have been to provide the tax authoriti~s with evidence upon which 
to base an assessment. Given the possibility of such dual purpose seizures, judicial testing 
for good faith may be a troublesome area in future cases similar to Janis. For a discussion 
of some of the difficulties involved in testing for good faith, see Comment, Fourth Amend-
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officers' good faith in sustaining the use of the evid_ence, the 
Court's holding is factually distinguishable from a case in which 
bad faith is present. 
3. The balancing formula 93 
The Court rejected the use of the exclusionary rule because 
it found the "likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state 
police" insufficient to outweigh the "societal costs imposed by the 
exclusion."94 Yet the Court was not explicit about the nature of 
those costs. It referred generally to the costs of proscribing rele-
vant evidence and of hampering law enforcement, 95 but it did not 
specifically address whether the cost element of the balancing 
test applied in criminal cases96 is equally serviceable in a civil 
case. 
The ultimate costs to society are obviously not the same in 
civil and criminal proceedings. In criminal cases, the cost of the 
exclusionary rule is that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the 
constable has blundered. " 97 The cost to society in applying the 
exclusionary rule in a civil tax assessment proceeding is largely 
monetary98-the tax assessment may be invalidated. This cost 
does not seem to be particularly high in view of the infrequent 
applications of the exclusionary rule in tax proceedings and the 
alternative means of tax assessment available to the IRS.99 If 
society values the conviction of criminals more highly than it does 
the collection of taxes, the cost to society of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in the instant case could be trivial in comparison to 
ment in the Balance-The Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 
611 (1976). 
93. For a discussion of the balancing formula, its origins, and its application to Janis, 
see Comment, Fourth Amendment in the Balance-The Exclusionary Rule After Stone 
v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 611 (1976). 
94. 428 U.S. at 454. 
95. /d. at 447. 
96. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
97. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
98. There may also be a "regulatory cost" involved in the frustration of the wagering 
provision-to the extent that the tax is seen to have a regulatory effect on wagerers. 
Although the extent of this cost is uncertain, it seems clear that the cost to society is still 
less than that involved in having a "criminal go free." Of course, if the tax assessment is 
perceived to constitute a quasi-criminal sanction, the potential cost to society is arguably 
closer to that involved in the criminal context. As long as the wagering tax is seen as a 
revenue raising measure, however, the quasi-criminal approach will not be valid. 
99. See Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 819-20 (1972); Duke, Prosecutions for 
Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 
1, 31 (1966). 
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the cost in a criminal case. The Court's effort to demonstrate the 
miniscule deterrent effect application of the exclusionary rule 
would have in the present case suggests that the Court is merely 
balancing trivialities against each other. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the Court's weighing is reason-
able. Even if it be admitted that the benefits and costs weighed 
by the Court are trivial by comparison to those at stake in crimi-
nal cases, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule may well 
exceed the benefits of ·the inconsequential deterrent effect the 
rule would have in the instant case. Thus, the balancing of appar-
ent trivialities in the instant case does not cast doubt upon the 
Court's method of analysis as much as it reveals the lack of com-
pelling reasons to apply the exclusionary rule in this factual con-
text. 
B. The Implications of Janis for Civil Proceedings 
The Court's statement of the holding does not explicitly pro-
hibit the exclusionary rule's application to civil proceedings gen-
erally.t00 Yet the thrust of the opinion substantially limits the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule in a variety of civil contexts. 
1. Seizures by private individuals 
Making specific reference to Burdeau v. McDowell, 101 the 
Court observed that the exclusionary rule is not applicable when 
a private party conducts the illegal seizure. 102 Although Burdeau 
has been termed "an anachronism," 103 and has been viewed as 
effectively overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 104 
the Court here gives notice that the case has vitality. This vitality 
is probably enough to discredit lower court decisions that have 
applied the exclusionary rule in proceedings involving private 
seizures. 105 
100. See 428 U.S. at 459-60. 
101. 256 u.s. 465 (1921). 
102. 428 U.S. at 455 n.31. The Court also referred to United States v. Stonehill, 274 
F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 
960 (1969), to note the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule when a foreign government 
commits the illegal search and seizure. 
103. Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. 
REv. 1314, 1359 (1967). 
104. Note 43 supra. 
105. This would be true provided the private seizure is conducted without govern-
ment participation or approbation. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra. 
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2. Seizures by government agents 
a. Private actions. If deterrence is the perceived justifica-
tion for applying the exclusionary rule, decisions applying the 
rule in private actions involving governmental searches and sei-
zures are of dubious merit-the threatened unavailability of the 
illegally seized evidence to private litigants would seem to have 
no deterrent effect on police, whose primary interest is govern-
ment criminal prosecutions}06 The particular analysis of deter-
rence in Janis makes this conclusion more compelling. If the de-
terrent effect is too attenuated to justify the rule's application in 
a government action when agents of another sovereign have con-
ducted the illegal search and seizure, then the inapplicability of 
the rule in a private civil action follows a fortiori. 
b. Actions in which the government is a party. An issue 
explicitly left open by the Court is whether the exclusionary rule 
is applicable in cases where the law enforcement officers are of 
the same sovereign that seeks to use the illegally obtained evi-
dence in a civil proceeding}07 The unanswered question is itself a 
function of the Court's novel effort to distinguish Janis from the 
tax cases in which the rule has been applied. The Court's reason-
ing that there is a difference in deterrent effect between situations 
involving "intrasovereign" and "intersovereign" fourth amend-
ment violations permits it to reject the result reached in Suarez, 108 
where the exclusionary rule was applied in a federal proceeding 
to suppress evidence seized by local law enforcement officers. It 
does not impair decisions like Pizzarello,l09 however, which in-
volve applications of the exclusionary rule in tax proceedings 
where federal agents conducted the unconstitutional seizures. 
Thus the decision is rather limited in one sense-it does not chal-
lenge most of the precedents in the civil tax assessment area. 
Given the Court's apparent inclination to limit the scope of the 
exclusionary rule, no however, it is not inconceivable that a future 
civil case involving an intrasovereign violation could be decided 
in much the same way as this case. 
c. Quasi-criminal cases. Even though Janis is a civil case, 
the opinion's reasoning raises the possibility that the exclusionary 
106. 428 U.S. at 458. 
107. Id. at 455 n.31. 
108. 58 T.C. 792 (1972). See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra. 
109. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969). See notes 60-61 and 
accompanying text supra. 
110. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra. 
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rule may not be applicable to all quasi-criminal situations. The 
Court implicitly recognized the general legitimacy of the exclu-
sionary rule's application in quasi-criminal cases by referring to 
the continued validity of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
Pennsylvania. 111 But Plymouth Sedan involved an intrasovereign 
fourth amendment violation. 112 Thus, the rationale of Janis, 
which finds a difference between intrasovereign and intersover-
eign fourth amendment violations, suggests the possibility that 
the exclusionary rule might not be applied if a quasi -criminal 
action were brought by a sovereign different from the one whose 
agents conducted the illegal seizure. 
While the above approach is plagued by substantial difficul-
ties, 113 an application of the Janis rationale to quasi-criminal 
cases is conceivable in light of the Supreme Court's rejection in 
Calandra of a mechanical application of the exclusionary rule in 
favor of application when its deterrence objectives are best 
served. 114 Deterrence effect could be just as attenuated in an in-
tersovereign quasi-criminal context as in an intersovereign civil 
setting. Thus an intersovereign fourth amendment violation in a 
quasi-criminal case could provide the Court with an opportunity 
to impose additional.limitations on the scope of the exclusionary 
rule. 115 
C. Deterrence and the Debilitation of the Judicial Integrity 
Rationale 
On several occasions the Supreme Court has asserted that 
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconsti-
tutional conduct by law enforcement officers. 118 The Court made 
111. 428 U.S. at 447 n.17. 
112. Pennsylvania agents made the initial seizure; the state brought the subsequent 
forfeiture action. 380 U.S. 693, 694 (1965). 
113. The Court would have to overturn or distinguish the quasi-criminal precedents 
that have applied the rule. It would also have to contend with the reality that fourth 
amendment protections are conceptually well established in the quasi-criminal sphere 
where significant penalties against property and liberty may be assessed. 
114. 414 u.s. 338, 348 (1974). 
115. The Court's distinction between intrasovereign and intersovereign fourth 
amendment violations conceivably could be applied in purely criminal cases as well. 
While such application might follow logically from the Court's approach in Janis, in view 
of the vitality of the exclusionary rule in the criminal context, it seems doubtful that the 
Court would choose to so limit the rule's applicability. 
116. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433) 446-47 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24 (1969). 
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the same assertion in this case. 117 But the Court went beyond this 
by defining judicial integrity in terms of deterrence: 
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context 
of evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or en-
courage violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth Amend-
ment area, however, the evidence is unquestionably accurate, 
and the violation is complete by the time the evidence is pre-
sented to the court .... The focus therefore must be on the 
question whether the admission of the evidence encourages vio-
lations of Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court has noted in 
recent cases, this inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry 
into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. 118 
This redefinition of judicial integrity in terms of deterrence 
may simply make explicit how the Court has been interpreting 
the judicial integrity justification for some time.U9 The explicit 
redefinition in Janis was clearly foreshadowed in United States 
v. Peltier: 120 "This approach to the 'imperative of judicial integ-
rity' does not differ markedly from the analysis the Court has 
utilized in determining whether the deterrence rationale under-
girding the exclusionary rule would be furthered by retroactive 
application of new constitutional doctrines."121 The definition of 
judicial integrity appearing in Janis, then, does not represent a 
divergence from recent opinions; rather it articulates more clearly 
how the Court had already been perceiving the judicial integrity 
rationale. 
The emaciation of the independent validity of the judicial 
117. 428 U.S. at 446. 
118. /d. at 458 n.35. 
119. It has been observed that judicial integrity as a justification for the exclusionary 
rule has been relegated to a minor role with dubious impact on the outcome of cases. Oaks, 
supra note 4, at 669. In 1973, a commentator suggested that one reason for the relative 
impotency of the judicial integrity rationale was that the Supreme Court had implicitly 
redefined it in terms of deterrence. The theory behind the redefinition was set forth as 
follows: 
This implicit redefinition may well have proceeded on the theory that har-
mony with the deterrence rationale could be achieved by defending the judicial 
integrity rationale in terms of its ultimate goals, rather than in terms of the 
responsibility which it places upon the Court to comprehensively protect a 
defendant's fourth amendment rights. Harmony is in fact possible under such 
a scheme, because the focus of a goal-oriented definition of the judicial integrity 
rationale, like that of the deterrence rationale, is upon public interests. 
Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope 
of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129, 1153 (1973). 
120. 422 u.s. 531 (1975). 
121. /d. at 538. 
230 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
integrity rationale was confirmed in Stone v. Powell, 122 which was 
decided concurrently with Janis. There, the Court referred to the 
"limited role of this justification [judicial integrity] in the deter-
mination whether to apply the [exclusionary] rule in a particu-
lar context."123 The Court repeated that deterrence was the exclu-
sionary rule's primary justification.124 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Janis is 
basically sound. The quasi-criminal argument for applying the 
exclusionary rule is relatively weak in view of the judicial ten-
dency to find the wagering excise tax a revenue raising measure 
instead of a penalty. The danger of the decision being perceived 
as a justification for bad faith searches and seizures seems to be 
obviated by the critical fact of good faith on the part of the local 
law enforcement agents in this case. Despite the Court's cursory 
treatment of the cost element of its balancing formula, its analy-
sis reveals a lack of compelling reasons to employ the exclusion-
ary rule in a civil action involving an intersovereign fourth 
amendment violation. 
The significance of the decision inheres in its aversion to 
applying the exclusionary rule in several civil contexts: civil ac-
tions involving nongovernmental illegal searches and seizures, 
civil actions brought by a sovereign different from the one whose 
agents conducted the illegal search and seizure, and, possibly, 
quasi-criminal actions of an intersovereign nature. The decision 
is also significant for its overt redefinition of the judicial integrity 
justification for the exclusionary rule. More explicitly than earlier 
Supreme Court decisions limiting the role of the judicial integrity 
rationale, Janis suggests that deterrence is not merely the pri-
mary justification for the rule; realistically, it is the only justifica-
tion. 
122. 428 u.s. 465 (1976). 
123. /d. at 485. 
124. ld. at 486. 
